

**ОЦЕНОЧНЫЕ МАТЕРИАЛЫ
ПО ДИСЦИПЛИНЕ**
Специальный перевод

Код модуля
1151652(1)

Модуль
Перевод в отраслях и сферах деятельности

Екатеринбург

Оценочные материалы составлены автором(ами):

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Согласовано:

Управление образовательных программ

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1. СТРУКТУРА И ОБЪЕМ ДИСЦИПЛИНЫ **Специальный перевод**

1.	Объем дисциплины в зачетных единицах	21	
2.	Виды аудиторных занятий	Практические/семинарские занятия	
3.	Промежуточная аттестация	Зачет Экзамен	
4.	Текущая аттестация	Контрольная работа	4
		Домашняя работа	4

2. ПЛАНИРУЕМЫЕ РЕЗУЛЬТАТЫ ОБУЧЕНИЯ (ИНДИКАТОРЫ) ПО ДИСЦИПЛИНЕ МОДУЛЯ **Специальный перевод**

Индикатор – это признак / сигнал/ маркер, который показывает, на каком уровне обучающийся должен освоить результаты обучения и их предъявление должно подтвердить факт освоения предметного содержания данной дисциплины, указанного в табл. 1.3 РПМ-РПД.

Таблица 1

Код и наименование компетенции	Планируемые результаты обучения (индикаторы)	Контрольно-оценочные средства для оценивания достижения результата обучения по дисциплине
1	2	3
ОПК-2 -Способен к подготовке аналитической информации и разработке экспертных заключений и рекомендаций для решения профессиональных задач	Д-1 - Демонстрировать аналитическое мышление, стремление к объективности оценки результатов профессиональной деятельности П-1 - Разрабатывать экспертные заключения и рекомендации для решения профессиональных задач У-2 - Верифицировать результаты экспертной оценки для достижения объективности при решении профессиональных задач	Домашняя работа № 1 Домашняя работа № 2 Домашняя работа № 3 Домашняя работа № 4 Зачет Практические/семинарские занятия
ПК-2 -Обеспечение межъязыкового и межкультурного взаимодействия в	З-2 - Знать регламент и протокол проведения конференций, совещаний, переговоров и заседаний, а	Контрольная работа № 1 Контрольная работа № 2 Контрольная работа № 3 Контрольная работа № 4

<p>устной и письменной формах в официальной, неофициальной и профессиональной сферах общения</p>	<p>также нормативно-правовые акты в части, касающейся трудовых отношений, ответственности и авторских прав переводчика З-5 - Знать теорию и практику, а также техническое обеспечение синхронного перевода П-6 - Осуществлять терминологический и лексикографический контроль, дорабатывать терминологические базы и глоссарии, подготавливать обратную связь переводчикам по результатам редактирования П-7 - Осуществлять технический контроль и оценку качества переведенных материалов, рейтингование переводчиков У-2 - Сохранять коммуникативную цель исходного сообщения, переводить устно и быстро переходить с одного языка на другой У-4 - Осуществлять всестороннюю подготовку к переводческому мероприятию, оформлять отчетные документы о выполненном переводе У-7 - Анализировать лингвистические, временные, финансовые и технологические ресурсы для выполнения переводческого задания, разрабатывать терминологические базы и глоссарии</p>	<p>Практические/семинарские занятия Экзамен</p>
<p>ПК-5 -Способен осуществлять межкультурное взаимодействие в соответствии с правилами вербального и невербального общения в иноязычном социуме, правилами и</p>	<p>З-4 - Знать нормы и стандарты узкоспециализированной области знаний, определяющей терминологический аппарат на исходном и переводящем языках, а также специализированные информационно-справочные системы З-8 - Знать общую, частную, специальную теорию перевода</p>	<p>Домашняя работа № 1 Домашняя работа № 2 Домашняя работа № 3 Домашняя работа № 4 Зачет Контрольная работа № 1 Контрольная работа № 2 Контрольная работа № 3 Контрольная работа № 4 Практические/семинарские занятия</p>

<p>традициями межкультурной профессиональной коммуникации с носителями изучаемого языка</p>	<p>и практические переводческие приемы З-9 - Знать терминологию предметной области перевода и специальную профессиональную лексику, принципы унификации и стандартизации терминов, государственные стандарты на термины, обозначения и единицы измерения П-4 - Изучать терминологию и информационные материалы для подготовки к переводу, составлять локальный тематический словарь, систематизировать информационные материалы о выполненном переводе У-4 - Определять тематическую область исходного сообщения, сохранять его коммуникативную цель и стилистический регистр У-6 - Применять правила редактирования текста перевода, вносить исправления в текст перевода в соответствии с рекомендациями редактора</p>	<p>Экзамен</p>
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3. ПРОЦЕДУРЫ КОНТРОЛЯ И ОЦЕНИВАНИЯ РЕЗУЛЬТАТОВ ОБУЧЕНИЯ В РАМКАХ ТЕКУЩЕЙ И ПРОМЕЖУТОЧНОЙ АТТЕСТАЦИИ ПО ДИСЦИПЛИНЕ МОДУЛЯ В БАЛЬНО-РЕЙТИНГОВОЙ СИСТЕМЕ (ТЕХНОЛОГИЧЕСКАЯ КАРТА БРС)

3.1. Процедуры текущей и промежуточной аттестации по дисциплине

<p>1. Лекции: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов лекционных занятий – не предусмотрено</p>		
<p>Текущая аттестация на лекциях</p>	<p>Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя</p>	<p>Максимальная оценка в баллах</p>
<p></p>		
<p>Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по лекциям – не предусмотрено</p>		
<p>Промежуточная аттестация по лекциям – нет Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по лекциям – не предусмотрено</p>		
<p>2. Практические/семинарские занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов практических/семинарских занятий – 1</p>		

Текущая аттестация на практических/семинарских занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
<i>домашняя работа № 1</i>	1,8	50
<i>контрольная работа № 1</i>	1,14	50
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по практическим/семинарским занятиям– 0.6		
Промежуточная аттестация по практическим/семинарским занятиям–зачет		
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по практическим/семинарским занятиям– 0.4		
3. Лабораторные занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов лабораторных занятий –не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на лабораторных занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по лабораторным занятиям -не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по лабораторным занятиям –нет		
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по лабораторным занятиям – не предусмотрено		
4. Онлайн-занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов онлайн-занятий –не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на онлайн-занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по онлайн-занятиям -не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по онлайн-занятиям –нет		
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по онлайн-занятиям – не предусмотрено		

3.2. Процедуры текущей и промежуточной аттестации курсовой работы/проекта

Текущая аттестация выполнения курсовой работы/проекта	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент текущей аттестации выполнения курсовой работы/проекта– не предусмотрено		
Весовой коэффициент промежуточной аттестации выполнения курсовой работы/проекта– защиты – не предусмотрено		

3.1. Процедуры текущей и промежуточной аттестации по дисциплине

2. Лекции: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов лекционных занятий – не предусмотрено

Текущая аттестация на лекциях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по лекциям – не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по лекциям – нет Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по лекциям – не предусмотрено		
2. Практические/семинарские занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов практических/семинарских занятий – 1		
Текущая аттестация на практических/семинарских занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
<i>домашняя работа № 2</i>	2,8	50
<i>контрольная работа № 2</i>	2,14	50
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по практическим/семинарским занятиям – 0.6		
Промежуточная аттестация по практическим/семинарским занятиям – зачет Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по практическим/семинарским занятиям – 0.4		
3. Лабораторные занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов лабораторных занятий – не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на лабораторных занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по лабораторным занятиям – не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по лабораторным занятиям – нет Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по лабораторным занятиям – не предусмотрено		
4. Онлайн-занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов онлайн-занятий – не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на онлайн-занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по онлайн-занятиям – не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по онлайн-занятиям – нет Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по онлайн-занятиям – не предусмотрено		

3.2. Процедуры текущей и промежуточной аттестации курсовой работы/проекта

Текущая аттестация выполнения курсовой работы/проекта	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
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Весовой коэффициент текущей аттестации выполнения курсовой работы/проекта– не предусмотрено		
Весовой коэффициент промежуточной аттестации выполнения курсовой работы/проекта– защиты – не предусмотрено		

3.1. Процедуры текущей и промежуточной аттестации по дисциплине

3. Лекции: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов лекционных занятий – не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на лекциях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по лекциям – не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по лекциям – нет		
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по лекциям – не предусмотрено		
2. Практические/семинарские занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов практических/семинарских занятий – 1		
Текущая аттестация на практических/семинарских занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
<i>домашняя работа № 3</i>	3,8	50
<i>контрольная работа № 3</i>	3,14	50
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по практическим/семинарским занятиям– 0.6		
Промежуточная аттестация по практическим/семинарским занятиям–зачет		
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по практическим/семинарским занятиям– 0.4		
3. Лабораторные занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов лабораторных занятий –не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на лабораторных занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по лабораторным занятиям -не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по лабораторным занятиям –нет		
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по лабораторным занятиям – не предусмотрено		
4. Онлайн-занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов онлайн-занятий –не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на онлайн-занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах

Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по онлайн-занятиям -не предусмотрено
Промежуточная аттестация по онлайн-занятиям –нет
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по онлайн-занятиям – не предусмотрено

3.2. Процедуры текущей и промежуточной аттестации курсовой работы/проекта

Текущая аттестация выполнения курсовой работы/проекта	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент текущей аттестации выполнения курсовой работы/проекта– не предусмотрено		
Весовой коэффициент промежуточной аттестации выполнения курсовой работы/проекта– защиты – не предусмотрено		

3.1. Процедуры текущей и промежуточной аттестации по дисциплине

4. Лекции: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов лекционных занятий – не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на лекциях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по лекциям – не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по лекциям – нет		
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по лекциям – не предусмотрено		
2. Практические/семинарские занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов практических/семинарских занятий – 1		
Текущая аттестация на практических/семинарских занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
<i>домашняя работа № 4</i>	4,8	50
<i>контрольная работа № 4</i>	4,14	50
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по практическим/семинарским занятиям– 0.6		
Промежуточная аттестация по практическим/семинарским занятиям– экзамен		
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по практическим/семинарским занятиям– 0.4		
3. Лабораторные занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов лабораторных занятий – не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на лабораторных занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по лабораторным занятиям -не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по лабораторным занятиям –нет		

Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по лабораторным занятиям – не предусмотрено		
4. Онлайн-занятия: коэффициент значимости совокупных результатов онлайн-занятий –не предусмотрено		
Текущая аттестация на онлайн-занятиях	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов текущей аттестации по онлайн-занятиям -не предусмотрено		
Промежуточная аттестация по онлайн-занятиям –нет		
Весовой коэффициент значимости результатов промежуточной аттестации по онлайн-занятиям – не предусмотрено		

3.2. Процедуры текущей и промежуточной аттестации курсовой работы/проекта

Текущая аттестация выполнения курсовой работы/проекта	Сроки – семестр, учебная неделя	Максимальная оценка в баллах
Весовой коэффициент текущей аттестации выполнения курсовой работы/проекта– не предусмотрено		
Весовой коэффициент промежуточной аттестации выполнения курсовой работы/проекта– защиты – не предусмотрено		

4. КРИТЕРИИ И УРОВНИ ОЦЕНИВАНИЯ РЕЗУЛЬТАТОВ ОБУЧЕНИЯ ПО ДИСЦИПЛИНЕ МОДУЛЯ

4.1. В рамках БРС применяются утвержденные на кафедре/институте критерии (признаки) оценивания достижений студентов по дисциплине модуля (табл. 4) в рамках контрольно-оценочных мероприятий на соответствие указанным в табл.1 результатам обучения (индикаторам).

Таблица 4

Критерии оценивания учебных достижений обучающихся

Результаты обучения	Критерии оценивания учебных достижений, обучающихся на соответствие результатам обучения/индикаторам
Знания	Студент демонстрирует знания и понимание в области изучения на уровне указанных индикаторов и необходимые для продолжения обучения и/или выполнения трудовых функций и действий, связанных с профессиональной деятельностью.
Умения	Студент может применять свои знания и понимание в контекстах, представленных в оценочных заданиях, демонстрирует освоение умений на уровне указанных индикаторов и необходимых для продолжения обучения и/или выполнения трудовых функций и действий, связанных с профессиональной деятельностью.
Опыт /владение	Студент демонстрирует опыт в области изучения на уровне указанных индикаторов.
Другие результаты	Студент демонстрирует ответственность в освоении результатов обучения на уровне запланированных индикаторов. Студент способен выносить суждения, делать оценки и формулировать выводы в области изучения.

	Студент может сообщать преподавателю и коллегам своего уровня собственное понимание и умения в области изучения.
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4.2 Для оценивания уровня выполнения критериев (уровня достижений обучающихся при проведении контрольно-оценочных мероприятий по дисциплине модуля) используется универсальная шкала (табл. 5).

Таблица 5

Шкала оценивания достижения результатов обучения (индикаторов) по уровням

Характеристика уровней достижения результатов обучения (индикаторов)				
№ п/п	Содержание уровня выполнения критерия оценивания результатов обучения (выполненное оценочное задание)	Шкала оценивания		
		Традиционная характеристика уровня		Качественная характеристика уровня
1.	Результаты обучения (индикаторы) достигнуты в полном объеме, замечаний нет	Отлично (80-100 баллов)	Зачтено	Высокий (В)
2.	Результаты обучения (индикаторы) в целом достигнуты, имеются замечания, которые не требуют обязательного устранения	Хорошо (60-79 баллов)		Средний (С)
3.	Результаты обучения (индикаторы) достигнуты не в полной мере, есть замечания	Удовлетворительно (40-59 баллов)		Пороговый (П)
4.	Освоение результатов обучения не соответствует индикаторам, имеются существенные ошибки и замечания, требуется доработка	Неудовлетворительно (менее 40 баллов)	Не зачтено	Недостаточный (Н)
5.	Результат обучения не достигнут, задание не выполнено	Недостаточно свидетельств для оценивания		Нет результата

5. СОДЕРЖАНИЕ КОНТРОЛЬНО-ОЦЕНОЧНЫХ МЕРОПРИЯТИЙ ПО ДИСЦИПЛИНЕ МОДУЛЯ

5.1. Описание аудиторных контрольно-оценочных мероприятий по дисциплине модуля

5.1.1. Практически/семинарские занятия

Примерный перечень тем

1. Political parties and associations

Примерные задания

1. Прочитайте текст.

2. Посмотрите в словаре все неизвестные слова.

3. Переведите текст на русский язык.

October 2016

This Factsheet does not bind the Court and is not exhaustive

Political parties and associations

Under the European Court of Human Rights' case-law, **Article 11** (freedom of assembly and association) of the [European Convention on Human Rights](#) applies to political parties. It reads as follows:

"1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.

2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State."

Role of political parties

In its case-law, the European Court of Human Rights has underlined the primordial role played in a democratic regime by political parties enjoying the freedoms and rights enshrined in Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) and also in Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention on Human Rights. However, it has held that the freedoms guaranteed by Article 11, and by Articles 9 (freedom of religion) and 10 of the Convention, could not deprive the authorities of a State in which an association jeopardised that State's institutions, of the right to protect those institutions.

Under the Court's case-law, "a political party may promote a change in the law or the legal and constitutional structures of the State on two conditions: firstly, the means used to that end must be legal and democratic; secondly, the change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic principles. It necessarily follows that a political party whose leaders incite to violence or put forward a policy which fails to respect democracy or which is aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy cannot lay claim to the Convention's protection against penalties imposed on those grounds ..." (see, in particular, [Yazar, Karatas, Aksoy and the People's Labour Party \(HEP\) v. Turkey](#), judgment of 9 April 2002, § 49).

The "exceptions set out in Article 11 are, where political parties are concerned, to be construed strictly; only convincing and compelling reasons can justify restrictions on such parties' freedom of association. In determining whether a necessity within the meaning of Article 11 § 2 exists, the Contracting States have only a limited margin of appreciation." (see, for example, [Refah Partisi \(The Welfare Party\) and Others v. Turkey](#), judgment of 13 February 2003, § 100).

Dissolution or prohibition of political parties

United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey

30 January 1998

The United Communist Party of Turkey ("the TBKP") was formed in June 1990. It was dissolved by an order of the Constitutional Court in July 1991 on the grounds that it had incorporated the word "communist" into its name, which was against Turkish law, and, in particular, that it had encouraged separatism and the division of the Turkish nation.

The Court found a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention. It considered that a political party's choice of name could not in principle justify a measure as drastic as dissolution, in the absence of other relevant and sufficient circumstances. In the absence of any concrete evidence to show that in choosing to call itself "communist", the TBKP had opted for a policy that represented a real threat to Turkish society or the Turkish State, the Court could not accept that the submission based on the party's name might, by itself, entail the party's dissolution. The Court noted that although the TBKP referred in its programme to the Kurdish "people" and "nation" and Kurdish "citizens", it neither described them as a "minority" nor make any claim – other than for recognition of their existence – for them to enjoy special treatment or rights, still less a right to secede from the rest of the Turkish population. The Court underlined that one of the principal characteristics of democracy was the possibility it offered of resolving a country's problems through dialogue. There could thus be no justification for hindering a political group solely because it sought to debate in public the situation of part of the State's population and to take part in the nation's political life in order to find, according to democratic rules, solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.

Socialist Party and Others v. Turkey

25 May 1998

The Socialist Party ("the SP") had been formed in February 1988. It was dissolved by an order of the Constitutional Court in July 1992. The Turkish court noted in particular that in its political message the SP referred to two nations: the Kurdish nation and the Turkish nation. It concluded that the SP encouraged separatism and incited a socially integrated community to fight for the creation of an independent federal State, which was unacceptable and justified the party's dissolution.

The Court found a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention. It noted that statements by the party's former chairman had referred to the right to self-determination of the "Kurdish nation" and its right to "secede". However, read in their context, the statements did not encourage secession from Turkey but sought to emphasise that the proposed federal system could not come about without the Kurds' freely given consent, which should be expressed through a referendum. In the Court's view, the fact that such a political programme was considered incompatible with the principles and structures of the Turkish State at the time did not make it incompatible with the rules of democracy. It was of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political programmes to be proposed and debated, even those that called into question the way a State was currently organised, provided that they did not harm democracy itself.

Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey

8 December 1999 (Grand Chamber)

The Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) was founded in October 1992. In July 1993, the Turkish Constitutional Court made an order dissolving ÖZDEP. While the proceedings concerning the party's dissolution – brought on the grounds that its programme sought to undermine the territorial integrity and secular nature of the State and the unity of the nation – were still pending, the founding members of the party resolved to dissolve it in order to protect themselves and the party leaders from the consequences of a dissolution order – namely a ban on their carrying on similar activities in other political parties.

The Court found a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention. It had not found anything in ÖZDEP's programme that could be considered a call for the use of violence, an uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic principles. On the contrary, the need to abide by democratic rules when implementing the proposed political project was stressed in the programme. In its programme ÖZDEP also referred to the right to self-determination of the "national or religious minorities". However, taken in context, those words did not encourage separation from Turkey but were intended instead to emphasise that the proposed political project must be underpinned by the freely given, democratically expressed, consent of the Kurds. In the Court's view, the fact that such a political project was considered incompatible with the current principles and structures of the Turkish State did not mean that it infringed democratic rules. It was of the essence of democracy to allow diverse political projects to be proposed and debated, even those that called into question the way a State was currently organised, provided that they did not seek to harm democracy itself.

Yazar, Karataş, Aksoy and the People's Labour Party (HEP) v. Turkey

9 April 2002

The HEP (Halkın Emeği Partisi – the People's Labour Party) was founded in 1990. It was dissolved in July 1993 by a judgment of the Turkish Constitutional Court on the ground that its activities were likely to undermine the territorial integrity of the State and the unity of the nation. The Constitutional Court criticised the HEP in particular for "seeking to divide the Turkish nation in two, with Turks on one side and Kurds on the other, with the aim of setting up separate States" and for "seeking to destroy national and territorial integrity".

The Court found a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention. It held in particular that the principles for which the HEP stood, such as the right of self-determination and recognition of language rights, were not, as such, contrary to the fundamental principles of democracy. If it were considered that merely by advocating those principles a political grouping was supporting acts of terrorism, this would diminish the possibility of dealing with related questions within the framework of democratic debate and allow armed movements to monopolise support for the principles concerned. Furthermore, even where proposals informed by such principles were likely to clash with the main strands of government policy or the convictions of a majority of the public, the proper functioning of democracy required political groupings to be able to introduce them into public debate in order to help to find solutions to problems of general interest concerning politicians of all persuasions. The Turkish court had not established that the HEP's policies were aimed at undermining the democratic regime in Turkey.

Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey

13 February 2003 (Grand Chamber)

Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party - "Refah") was founded in July 1983. It was dissolved in January 1998 by a judgment of the Turkish Constitutional Court on the ground that it had become a "centre of activities against the principle of secularism". The Turkish Constitutional Court also declared that Refah's assets were to be transferred to the Treasury. The Constitutional Court further held that the public declarations of Refah's leaders had been unconstitutional. Consequently, it banned them from sitting in Parliament or holding certain political posts for five years.

The Court found **no violation of Article 11** of the Convention. It considered that the acts and speeches of Refah's members and leaders cited by the Turkish Constitutional Court had been imputable to the whole of the party, that those acts and speeches had revealed Refah's long-term policy of setting up a regime based on sharia within the framework of a plurality of legal systems and that Refah had not excluded recourse to force in order to implement its policy. Given that those plans were incompatible with the concept of a "democratic society" and that the real opportunities Refah had had to put them into practice had made the danger to democracy tangible and immediate, the decision of the Constitutional Court, even in the context of the restricted margin of

appreciation left to it, might reasonably be considered to have met a "pressing social need".

Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v. Romania

3 February 2005

Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi), a party of Communists who had not been members of the Romanian Communist Party, "the PCN", had been founded in March 1996. Its registration as a party was refused by the Romanian courts in a decision upheld in August 1996 on the grounds that the PCN was seeking to gain political power in order to establish a "humane State" founded on communist doctrine, meaning that it considered the constitutional and legal order that had been in place since 1989 as inhumane and not based on genuine democracy.

The Court found a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention. Having examined the PCN's constitution and political programme – on the sole basis of which the Romanian courts had rejected the application for the party's registration – it noted that they stressed the importance of upholding the national sovereignty, territorial integrity and legal and constitutional order of the country, and democratic principles including political pluralism, universal suffrage and freedom to participate in politics. They did not contain any passages that might be considered a call for the use of violence, an uprising or any other form of rejection of democratic principles. It was true that there were passages criticising both the abuses of the former Communist Party before 1989, from which the PCN distanced itself, and the policy that had been followed subsequently. However, the Court considered that there could be no justification for hindering a political group that complied with the fundamental principles of democracy solely because it had criticised the constitutional and legal order of the country and had sought a public debate in the political arena. Romania's experience of totalitarian communism prior to 1989 could not by itself justify the need for the interference with the party's freedom of association.

Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v. Spain

30 June 2009

Having previously been established as an electoral coalition Herri Batasuna was registered as a political party in 1986 and Batasuna sought registration as a political party in 2001. In 2003, the Spanish Supreme Court declared both parties illegal, ordered their dissolution and liquidated their assets. It referred to the 2002 law on political parties, finding that the parties were part of "a terrorist strategy of tactical separation" and that there were significant similarities between them and the terrorist organisation ETA.

The Court found **no violation of Article 11** of the Convention. It held in particular that the Spanish courts, after a detailed study of the evidence before them, had arrived at the reasonable conclusion that there was a link between the applicant parties and ETA. In view of the situation that had existed in Spain for many years with regard to terrorist attacks, those links could objectively be considered as a threat for democracy.

HADEP and Demir v. Turkey

14 December 2010

The People's Democracy Party, "HADEP", a smaller opposition party, had been established in May 1994. According to its programme, it advocated "a democratic solution to the Kurdish problem". HADEP was dissolved in 2003 by a decision of the Turkish Constitutional Court, finding that the party had become a centre of illegal activities, which included aiding and abetting the illegal Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK). The Constitutional Court further banned a number of HADEP's party members from becoming founders or members of any other political party for five years.

The Court found a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention. It held that certain statements made by party members – calling the actions of the Turkish security forces in south-east Turkey in their fight against terrorism a "dirty war" – to which the Turkish court had referred when concluding that HADEP was guilty of aiding and abetting the PKK, were a sharp criticism of the Government's policy but did not encourage violence,

armed resistance or insurrection. Those statements could therefore not in themselves constitute sufficient evidence to equate the party with armed groups carrying out acts of violence. The European Court further found, in particular, that statements by HADEP members which considered the Kurdish nation as distinct from the Turkish nation had to be read together with the party's aims as set out in its programme, namely that it had been established to solve the country's problems in a democratic manner. Even if HADEP advocated the right to self-determination of the Kurds, that would not in itself be contrary to democratic principles and could not be equated to supporting acts of terrorism.

Republican Party of Russia v. Russia

12 April 2011

The applicant party was created in 1990 by the consolidation of the Democratic Wing of the USSR Communist Party and its subsequent secession from that party. In August 2002, it was registered as a party by the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation. Before the Court, the applicant party complained that in 2006 the Ministry of Justice refused to amend information about it contained in the State register of legal entities, which had allegedly disrupted its activities, and that it was dissolved in 2007 for failure to comply with the requirements of minimum membership and regional representation.

The Court held that there had been a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention on account both of the authorities' refusal to amend information about the applicant party in the State register and of the party's dissolution. With regard to the latter, it found that the Russian courts had not adduced relevant and sufficient reasons to justify the interference with the applicant party's right to freedom of association and the party's dissolution for failure to comply with the requirements of minimum membership and regional representation had been disproportionate to the legitimate aims cited by the Russian Government. In particular, in the Court's view, there would be means of protecting Russia's laws, institutions and national security other than a sweeping ban on the establishment of regional parties. Moreover, the applicant party, which had existed and participated in elections since 1990, had never advocated regional interests or separatist views, indeed one of its aims had been promotion of the country's unity.

Parti for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others v. Turkey

12 January 2016

This case concerned the dissolution of the Party for a Democratic Society ("the DTP", *Demokratik Toplum Partisi*), part of the pro-Kurdish left-wing political movement, and the forfeiture of the parliamentary mandates of certain of its members of parliament, including those of its co-presidents. The applicants – on the one hand, the DTP, and, on the other, the party's co-presidents and individuals exercising various functions in the party – complained in particular that the dissolution of the DTP had infringed their right to freedom of association.

The Court held that there had been a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention in respect of all the applicants. It found in particular that the reasons put forward by the Constitutional Court for ordering the DTP's dissolution, one of the main political actors which had argued in favour of a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem, could not be regarded as sufficient to justify the interference in its right to freedom of association. The Court did not identify any DTP political project that was incompatible with the concept of a democratic society; it also considered that the speeches made by its two co-presidents were not such as to justify this dissolution, in so far as they had not encouraged the use of violence, armed resistance or insurrection. The Court noted, however, that taking such a measure on the ground that the party had not openly distanced itself from the acts or speeches of its members or local leaders that could be interpreted as indirect support for terrorism could reasonably be held to have met a "pressing social need". However, it considered that, having regard to the relatively limited political impact on public order or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, this failure to act could not in itself amount to a reason justifying a sanction of such severity as the dissolution of an entire party.

Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD) v. Germany

4 October 2016 (decision on the admissibility)

This case concerned a political party, the NPD, and its complaint about being referred to and stigmatised as being both far-right and unconstitutional. In particular, the party alleged that there had been a wide range of infringements of its legal rights in Germany (amounting to a *de facto* ban), and that it had had no means to redress these. Examples of alleged violations included the dismissal of its members from jobs in public service; the inability of the party to open bank accounts; and the prevention of its candidates from standing in elections.

The Court declared the application **inadmissible** as being manifestly ill-founded, finding that sufficient remedies had been available to the NPD at the national level, which had enabled it to effectively enforce its rights under the Convention. The NPD and its members had been able to challenge individual cases of discrimination or restrictions in the German courts. Such remedies had not been made ineffective for any of the reasons advanced by the NPD. In particular, domestic proceedings were not made ineffective because they were not always successful; because they could only provide a remedy for violations after they had happened; or because multiple sets of proceedings were required to address multiple instances of alleged violations. The NPD and/or its members were able to address alleged violations before the criminal, civil and administrative courts, if/when violations occurred in individual cases. Indeed, a declaratory judgment about the party's constitutionality was not required in order for such proceedings to be brought.

Refusal to register a political party**Linkov v. the Czech Republic**

7 December 2006

This case concerned the refusal to register the political party *Liberální Strana* (Liberal Party) on the ground that one of its aims, that of "breaking the legal continuity with totalitarian regimes", was anti-constitutional. The applicant, who was a member of the preparatory committee of the party in question, submitted in particular that the refusal of the authorities to register the party had infringed his right to freedom of association.

The Court held that there had been a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention, finding that, as *Liberální Strana* had not advocated any policy that could have undermined the democratic regime in the country and had not urged or sought to justify the use of force for political ends, the refusal to register it had not been necessary in a democratic society. The Court noted in particular that there was no evidence that *Liberální Strana* had not sought to pursue its aims by lawful and democratic means, or that its proposed change of the law had been incompatible with fundamental democratic principles, especially as the party's registration had been refused before it had even had time to carry out any activities. The Court reiterated in that connection that the refusal to register a party was a drastic measure that could be applied only in the most serious cases.

Financing of political parties**Basque Nationalist Party – Iparralde Regional Organisation v. France**

7 June 2007

The applicant party is the French "branch" of the Spanish Basque Nationalist Party. In order to be able to receive funds, in particular financial contributions from the Spanish party, it formed a funding association in accordance with the 1988 Political Life (Financial Transparency) Act. However, authorisation of the association, a prerequisite for its operation, was refused on the ground that most of the applicant party's resources derived from the support it received from the Spanish party. The applicant party

complained of the adverse effects on its funds and on its ability to pursue its political activities, particularly in the electoral sphere.

The Court held that there had been **no violation of Article 11 taken alone or in conjunction with Article 10** (freedom of expression) of the Convention. It considered, first of all, that the refusal of the request for approval of the funding association amounted to interference with the exercise by the applicant party of the rights guaranteed by Article 11, which had been prescribed by law and pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder. As to whether the interference had been necessary, the Court observed that the fact that political parties were not permitted to receive funds from foreign political parties was not in itself incompatible with Article 11 of the Convention. In that connection it pointed out in particular that, while the applicant party could not receive financial assistance from the Spanish Basque Nationalist Party, it could nevertheless fund its political activities with the help of members' contributions and donations from individuals – including those from outside France – which it could collect through a financial agent or a funding association approved on the basis of a new application. Furthermore, there was nothing to prevent it from receiving funds from other French political parties or from taking advantage of the system of public funding put in place by the French legislature. The Court therefore found that the measure in question did not have a disproportionate impact on the ability of the applicant party to conduct its political activities. While the prohibition on receiving contributions from the Spanish Basque Nationalist Party had an effect on the party's finances, the situation in which it found itself as a result was no different from that of any small political party facing a shortage of funds.

Inspection of political parties' expenditure

Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi v. Turkey

26 April 2016

This case concerned the confiscation of a substantial part of the assets of Turkey's main opposition party, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, by the Constitutional Court following an inspection of its accounts for the years 2007 to 2009. The applicant party complained that the confiscation orders had put a substantial financial strain on its political activities. It notably complained about the authorities' failure to provide at the relevant time for a clear, foreseeable and predictable basis in law making it possible, firstly, to determine in advance the kinds of expenditure which fell within the scope of "unlawful expenditure" and, secondly, to anticipate the circumstances in which the Constitutional Court would issue a warning, rather than a confiscation order, in response to a financial irregularity.

The Court held that there had been a **violation of Article 11** of the Convention, finding that the high standard of foreseeability required as regards laws that govern the inspection of the finances of political parties had not been satisfied in the applicant party's case. It noted in particular that requiring political parties to subject their finances to official inspection did not in itself raise an issue under Article 11, as it served the goals of transparency and accountability, thus ensuring public confidence in the political process. The Court stressed however that, having regard to the important role played by political parties in democratic societies, any legal regulations which might have the effect of interfering with their freedom of association, such as the inspection of their expenditure, had to be couched in terms that provided a reasonable indication as to how those provisions would be interpreted and applied. In the applicant party's case, the scope of the notion of unlawful expenditure under the relevant legal provisions in force at the time as well as the applicable sanctions for unlawful expenditure had, however, been ambiguous.

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.2. Описание внеаудиторных контрольно-оценочных мероприятий и средств текущего контроля по дисциплине модуля

Разноуровневое (дифференцированное) обучение.

Базовый

5.2.1. Контрольная работа № 1

Примерный перечень тем

1. Средства информатизации

Примерные задания

Выполните перевод на английский язык:

Общая характеристика и классификация технических средств информатизации

Технические средства информатизации – аппаратный базис информационных технологий

В процессе своего развития человеческое общество прошло этапы проникновения в тайны материи, научилось управлять различными видами энергии и, наконец, вступило в

эпоху информатизации. До середины XIX в., когда доминирующими были процессы сбора и накопления информации, средства информатизации представляли собой перо, чернильницу и бумагу. На смену примитивным средствам информационной техники в конце XIX в. пришли механические: пишущая машинка, телефон, телеграф, что послужило базой для принципиальных изменений в технологии обработки информации. Лишь спустя много лет информационные процессы запоминания и передачи информации были дополнены процессами ее обработки. Это стало возможным с появлением во второй половине XX в. такой информационной техники, как электронные вычислительные машины (ЭВМ), положившие начало информационным технологиям.

Информационные технологии базируются на следующих технических достижениях: новые средства накопления информации на машиночитаемых носителях (магнитные ленты, кинофильмы, магнитные и лазерные диски и т.п.); системы дистанционной передачи информации (локальные вычислительные сети, сети передачи данных, телефонная сеть, радиосвязь, спутниковая связь и др.); автоматизированная обработка информации с помощью компьютера по заданным алгоритмам.

Естественно, что информационные технологии строятся на сочетании аппаратных средств, программных средств и творческой мысли создателей как этих средств, так и компьютерных технологий.

Специалисты называют аппаратные средства компьютерной техники Hardware (скобяные товары или жесткая проволока), а программное обеспечение – Software (мягкая проволока). Сочетание «Hardware&Software», переводимое как «твердый и мягкий», – профессиональный термин. В России программы на профессиональном сленге иногда называют новым словом «софтвер», а компьютер и периферию – «железом». Приоритетность роли программных или аппаратных средств в информационных технологиях не подлежит обсуждению, поскольку без программного обеспечения любой самый совершенный компьютер представляет собой набор электронных плат.

Технические средства информатизации представляют собой совокупность компьютерной техники и ее периферийных устройств – Hardware, обеспечивающих сбор, хранение и переработку информации, и коммуникационной техники (телефон, телеграф, радио, телевидение, спутниковая связь, сети ЭВМ), осуществляющей дистанционную передачу информации.

Создание электронно-вычислительных машин в середине XX в. является одним из самых выдающихся достижений в истории человечества. Постоянное развитие индустрии компьютерной техники и других технических средств информатизации за короткий срок превратилось в один из определяющих факторов научно-технического прогресса. Многие крупные научно-технические проекты современности в области космических исследований, атомной энергетики, экологии не могли бы претворяться в жизнь без применения технических средств информатизации. На протяжении последних десятилетий информационные технологии, базирующиеся на современных технических средствах информатизации, все активней вторгаются в различные сферы человеческой деятельности. Несомненна тесная взаимосвязь совершенствования программного обеспечения, технических средств информатизации и наукоемких технологий, на базе которых они производятся. Разработка нового программного обеспечения требует создания все более совершенных технических средств, что, в свою очередь, стимулирует

разработку новых высокопроизводительных и экономичных технологических процессов для производства технических средств информатизации.

Классификация ТСИ

Современные технические средства информатизации в общем случае можно представить в виде информационно-вычислительного комплекса, содержащего собственно компьютер с его основными устройствами, а также дополнительные, или периферийные устройства.

К числу основных устройств персонального компьютера, располагающихся в его системном блоке, относят материнскую плату, процессор, видеоадаптер (видеокарту), звуковую карту, средства обработки видеосигнала, оперативную память, TV-тюнер. В системном блоке располагаются также приводы и дисководы для накопителей информации различных типов: на гибких и жестких дисках, компакт-дисках типа CD-ROM, CD-R, CD-RW, DVD.

Устройства отображения информации служат для обработки видеoinформации и ее представления для визуального восприятия. Это прежде всего мониторы, изготовленные на базе широкого спектра современных технологий. Формирование объемных изображений осуществляется с помощью шлемов виртуальной реальности, 3D-очков и 3D-мониторов различного принципа действия. Для решения задач, связанных с демонстрацией информации на экране для большой аудитории, применяют оверхед-проекторы, жидкокристаллические панели и мультимедийные проекторы. Для обеспечения взаимосвязи между компьютером и устройством отображения информации служит видеоадаптер, выполняющий преобразование цифрового сигнала, циркулирующего внутри ПК, в аналоговые электрические сигналы, подаваемые на монитор. Для компьютерной обработки сигналов таких устройств, как телевизионный тюнер, видеоманитофон, видеокамера, т. е. преобразования их из аналоговой в цифровую форму, применяют специальные средства обработки видеосигнала, например, видеобластер.

Звуковая и акустическая системы компьютера обеспечивают обработку и воспроизведение аудиоинформации. Устройства ввода информации представляют собой совокупность устройств управления и ввода данных. Эти функции выполняют клавиатура, мышь, джойстик. Для ввода информации в ПК все более широко применяются световое перо, сканер, цифровая камера, дигитайзер. Особым разнообразием конструктивных решений отличаются сканеры. Они бывают планшетные, роликовые, барабанные, проекционные, ручные и многофункциональные.

Печатающие устройства (принтеры) служат для вывода на твердые, как правило, бумажные носители текстовой информации. По принципу действия принтеры весьма разнообразны: ударные, струйные, лазерные, светодиодные, термические. Для вывода графической информации в виде чертежей используют плоттеры. Функционирование пишущих блоков плоттеров основано на тех же принципах, что и принтеров, а по конструкции они подразделяются на планшетные и рулонные.

Средства телекоммуникаций предназначены для дистанционной передачи информации. К ним относятся пейджеры, радиотелефоны, персональные терминалы для спутниковой связи, обеспечивающие передачу звуковой и текстовой информации. Факсимильные аппараты, осуществляющие процесс дистанционной передачи изображения и текста, подразделяются на термографические, электрографические, струйные, лазерные, фотографические, электрохимические и электромеханические. Модемы в основном

используются для обмена информацией между компьютерами через телефонную линию и конструктивно выполняются как внешними, функционирующими автономно, так и внутренними, встраиваемыми в аппаратуру.

Широко распространенными средствами работы с информацией на твердых носителях являются многочисленные устройства копировальной техники: электрографические, термографические, диазографические, фотографические, электронно-графические. Для уничтожения конфиденциальной информации на твердых носителях используются специальные устройства – шредеры.

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.2.2. Контрольная работа № 2

Примерный перечень тем

1. Соглашения и их перевод

Примерные задания

Выполните перевод договора на английский язык:

Договор о создании совместного предприятия

Статья 1

Название предприятия и местонахождение

1.01. Российский участник и иностранный участник создают совместное предприятие под названием «Бинно Сайклз», именуемое в дальнейшем Предприятие. Официальное местонахождение предприятия – Россия.

Статья 2

Предмет и цели деятельности предприятия

2.01. Предметом деятельности предприятия являются производство и сбыт товаров народного потребления, маркетинг, инжиниринг, туризм, услуги автосервиса и прокат автомобилей.

2.02. Целью деятельности предприятия является насыщение рынка товарами и услугами, повышение экономической эффективности инженерной деятельности, освоение передовой техники и методов управления.

2.03. Для реализации поименованного в пункте 2.01 настоящего договора предмета деятельности и достижения, указанных в пункте 2.02 настоящего договора целей, предприятие осуществляет на территории Нижегородской области и в других регионах Российской Федерации, а также на территории Гонконга и третьих стран:

2.03.02. производство и сбыт товаров народного потребления;

2.03.02. производство, переработку, упаковку и сбыт продуктов питания;

2.03.04. услуги в области маркетинга, выпуск и сбыт рекламной продукции;

2.03.05. инжиниринг;

2.03.06. производство и реализацию продукции производственно-технического назначения;

2.03.07. организацию и проведение международного туризма;

2.03.08. организацию гостиничного обслуживания, бытовых услуг, а также отдыха и досуга российских и иностранных граждан;

2.03.09. прокат автомобилей и автосервисные услуги русских и иностранных граждан;

2.03.10. выполнение других работ и предоставление услуг, вытекающих из предмета деятельности предприятия.

В случае необходимости предприятие может расширить предмет своей деятельности с соответствующей перерегистрацией по представлению правления.

Приоритеты реализации аспектов деятельности предприятия, предусмотренных настоящим договором, определяются размером имеющихся в его распоряжении средств, конъюнктурой и ценами на мировом рынке, исходя из условий стабильности его производственной, финансовой и коммерческой деятельности, обеспечения возможностей более гибкой переориентации при изменении конъюнктуры, что необходимо в условиях валютной самокупаемости и самофинансирования.

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.2.3. Контрольная работа № 3

Примерный перечень тем

1. Перевод общественно-политических текстов

Примерные задания

Выполните перевод на английский язык:

Анализируя процесс политических реформ в КНР, следует отметить, что в течение первых 20 лет реформ и открытости Китая экономический рост не сопровождался развитием общества. Политические реформы не поспевали за экономическими, несовершенство политической системы сдерживало экономические реформы и развитие.

В силу этого XVI съезд КПК поднял политику до уровня «политической культуры» по аналогии с «материальной культурой» и «духовной культурой». В первое 20-летие XXI в. с целью завершить всестороннее построение общества «малого достатка» Китай должен создать «совершенную систему социалистической рыночной экономики», построить «гармоничное социалистическое общество».

Для достижения этих целей политические реформы в Китае должны обеспечить «совершенствование социалистической демократии» и «социалистического правового государства». В первые годы XXI в. реформы принесли ряд значимых достижений: политическую стабильность, мирную смену поколений власти, существенное повышение уровня политической демократии.

Пройден первый этап формирования правового социалистического государства, возросли способность и уровень руководства со стороны правящей партии, усилилось партийное строительство. Но и в начале второго десятилетия XXI в. осуществление законодательства, демократии сталкивается со многими вызовами, особенно с активизацией национализма в начале века.

Вместе с тем «китайская мечта» мобилизует грандиозные силы единства, чтобы Китай смог: а) углубить реформы и увеличить открытость; б) решить все свои общественно-политические проблемы; в) повысить руководящую и властную мощь КПК. Процесс осуществления «китайской мечты» также означает стремление к вершинам экономики, политики, военного дела, технологий в мире, овладение ими, отражает процесс становления новой великой державы, которая придёт на смену США.

Политические реформы с целью осуществления «китайской мечты» связаны с мирным развитием, внесением вклада в развитие и прогресс человечества, совместным со всеми соседними странами успешным развитием. Иначе Китай повторит историю краха и упадка цивилизаций и великих держав.

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.2.4. Контрольная работа № 4

Примерный перечень тем

1. Сделки

Примерные задания

Переведите предложения с русского языка на английский

1. Мы рады подучить Ваше письмо от 23 июля, в котором Вы сообщаете, что Вы интересуетесь станком модели К 14. Согласно Вашей просьбе, мы направляем наш каталог, демонстрирующий полный ассортимент наших изделий, и с нетерпением ждем вашего первого заказа.

2. Мы согласны на Ваше предложение, Вы получите невалютированный полис, и мы считаем, что става в 10 процентов является вполне умеренной. Однако, по нашему мнению, можно достичь большой экономии как в страховке, так и во фрахте, если Вы используете контейнеры.

3. Вы сообщаете, что получили партию товара по заказу № 12/93 от 6 сего месяца. При вскрытии ящиков вы обнаружили, что некоторые изделия повреждены. На этом основании вы настаиваете на скидке с цены в 20%. Данная сумма должна быть возвращена до конца месяца.

4. Все расходы, связанные с открытием и возможным продлением аккредитива, а также с использованием аккредитива, относятся на счет Покупателя.

5. Для обеспечения деятельности предприятия образуется уставной фонд за счет вкладов участников.

6. Оценка материальных ценностей производится участниками по согласованным договорным ценам с учетом цен мирового рынка.

7. Предприятие пользуется кредитами в русских рублях и иностранной валюте в порядке, установленном для совместных предприятий.

8. Если Вы закупите двигатели на условиях ФОБ, то цена составит 120 фунтов за единицу.

9. Аккредитив должен быть открыт в течение 10 дней после получения от продавца извещения о готовности товара к отправке.

10. В случае девальвации американского доллара обе стороны имеют право повторно обсудить цену на товар.

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.2.5. Домашняя работа № 1

Примерный перечень тем

1. Перевод химических текстов

Примерные задания

Выполните перевод на русский язык:

Discovery of Oxygen

The word oxygen is derived from the Greek words 'oxys' meaning acid and 'genes' meaning forming.

Before it was discovered and isolated, a number of scientists had recognized the existence of a substance with the properties of oxygen:

In the early 1500s Leonardo da Vinci observed that a fraction of air is consumed in respiration and combustion.

In 1665 Robert Hooke noted that air contains a substance which is present in potassium nitrate [potassium nitrate releases oxygen when heated,] and a larger quantity of an unreactive substance [which we call nitrogen].

In 1668 John Mayow wrote that air contains the gas oxygen [he called it nitroarial spirit], which is consumed in respiration and burning.

Mayow observed that: substances do not burn in air from which oxygen is absent; oxygen is present in the acid part of potassium nitrate [i.e., in the nitrate - he was right!]; animals absorb oxygen into their blood when they breathe; air breathed out by animals has less oxygen in it than fresh air.

Oxygen was discovered in 1774 by Joseph Priestley in England and two years earlier, but unpublished, by Carl W. Scheele in Sweden.

Scheele heated several compounds including potassium nitrate, manganese oxide, and mercury oxide and found they released a gas which enhanced combustion.

Priestley heated mercury oxide, focusing sunlight using a 12-inch ‘burning lens’ – a very large magnifying glass – to bring the oxide to a high temperature. Priestley’s lens was smaller than the enormous one used by Antoine Lavoisier in his investigation of carbon.

Totally unexpectedly, the hot mercury oxide yielded a gas that made a candle burn five times faster than normal. Priestley wrote: “But what surprised me more than I can well express was that a candle burned in this air with a remarkably vigorous flame. I was utterly at a loss how to account for it.”

In addition to noticing the effect of oxygen on combustion, Priestley later noted the new gas’s biological role. He placed a mouse in a jar of oxygen, expecting it would survive for 15 minutes maximum before it suffocated. Instead, the mouse survived for a whole hour and was none the worse for it.

Antoine Lavoisier carried out similar experiments to Priestley’s and added to our knowledge enormously by discovering that air contains about 20 percent oxygen and that when any substance burns, it actually combines chemically with oxygen.

Lavoisier also found that the weight of the gas released by heating mercury oxide was identical to the weight lost by the mercury oxide, and that when other elements react with oxygen their weight gain is identical to the weight lost from the air.

This enabled Lavoisier to state a new fundamental law: the law of the conservation of matter; “matter is conserved in chemical reactions” or, alternatively, “the total mass of a chemical reaction’s products is identical to the total mass of the starting materials.”

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.2.6. Домашняя работа № 2

Примерный перечень тем

1. Коммерческий перевод

Примерные задания

Выполните перевод на русский язык:

General Conditions and Terms of Delivery and Payment

1. The goods are considered delivered by the Seller and accepted by the Buyer:
in respect of quality – as per the quality stipulated in the Quality Certificate issued by the manufacturer;
in respect of quantity – as per the quantity of packages and the weight indicated in the Bill of Lading.
2. The date of the Bill of Lading is considered as the date of delivery.
3. The Seller undertakes to insure the goods to the full value of respected invoice against all risks. The terms of the transport insurance can be extended only at the Buyer's request and for his account.
4. The Seller should advise the Buyer of the shipments effected by cable or by airmail.
5. Payment of the delivered goods is to be effected by an Irrevocable Confirmed Letter of Credit opened by the Buyer in the Seller's favour with a bank correspondent to Vnesheconombank.

The Letter of Credit is to be opened within 10 days upon receipt of the Seller's notification of the readiness of the goods for shipment, to be valid for 90 days and to cover full value of the goods ready for shipment.

The Letter of Credit should fully conform to the terms of the present Contract and stipulate partial shipment.

Payment against the Letter of Credit should be made against the following documents submitted by the Seller to Vnesheconombank of the Russian Federation:

- a) Invoice in triplicate,
- b) Full set of Bills of Lading,
- c) Specification in triplicate.

All expenses, connected with the opening and eventual prolongation of the Letter of Credit, as well as all banking charges relevant to the opening and use of the Letter of Credit, are to be borne by the Buyer.

In case of delay in the opening of the Letter of Credit the Seller has right to refrain from shipment or cancel the Contract.

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.2.7. Домашняя работа № 3

Примерный перечень тем

1. Общественно-политический перевод

Примерные задания

Выполните перевод на русский язык:

Types of Political Systems

Various states and governments obviously exist around the world. In this context, state means the political unit within which power and authority reside. This unit can be a whole nation or a subdivision within a nation. Thus the nations of the world are sometimes referred to as states (or nation-states), as are subdivisions within a nation, such as California, New York, and Texas in the United States. Government means the group of persons who direct the political affairs of a state, but it can also mean the type of rule by which a state is run. Another term for this second meaning of government is political system, which we will use here along with government. The type of government under which people live has fundamental implications for their freedom,

their welfare, and even their lives. Accordingly, we briefly review the major political systems in the world today.

Democracy

The type of government with which we are most familiar is democracy, or a political system in which citizens govern themselves either directly or indirectly. The term democracy comes from Greek and means “rule of the people.” In Lincoln’s stirring words from the Gettysburg Address, democracy is “government of the people, by the people, for the people.” In direct (or pure) democracies, people make their own decisions about the policies and distribution of resources that affect them directly. An example of such a democracy in action is the New England town meeting, where the residents of a town meet once a year and vote on budgetary and other matters. However, such direct democracies are impractical when the number of people gets beyond a few hundred. Representative democracies are thus much more common. In these types of democracies, people elect officials to represent them in legislative votes on matters affecting the population.

Representative democracy is more practical than direct democracy in a society of any significant size, but political scientists cite another advantage of representative democracy. At least in theory, it ensures that the individuals who govern a society and in other ways help a society function are the individuals who have the appropriate talents, skills, and knowledge to do so. In this way of thinking, the masses of people are, overall, too uninformed, too uneducated, and too uninterested to run a society themselves. Representative democracy thus allows for “the cream to rise to the top” so that the people who actually govern a society are the most qualified to perform this essential task. Although this argument has much merit, it is also true that many of the individuals who do get elected to office turn out to be ineffective and/or corrupt. Regardless of our political orientations, Americans can think of many politicians to whom these labels apply, from presidents down to local officials.

The defining feature of representative democracy is voting in elections. When the United States was established more than 230 years ago, most of the world’s governments were monarchies or other authoritarian regimes. Like the colonists, people in these nations chafed under arbitrary power. The example of the American Revolution and the stirring words of its Declaration of Independence helped inspire the French Revolution of 1789 and other revolutions since, as people around the world have died in order to win the right to vote and to have political freedom.

Democracies are certainly not perfect. Their decision-making process can be quite slow and inefficient; as just mentioned, decisions may be made for special interests and not “for the people”; and, as we have seen in earlier chapters, pervasive inequalities of social class, race and ethnicity, gender, and age can exist. Moreover, in not all democracies have all people enjoyed the right to vote. In the United States, for example, African Americans could not vote until after the Civil War, with the passage of the 15th Amendment in 1870, and women did not win the right to vote until 1920, with the passage of the 19th Amendment.

In addition to generally enjoying the right to vote, people in democracies also have more freedom than those in other types of governments. The freest nations are found in North America, Western Europe, and certain other parts of the world, while the least free lie in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

Monarchy

Monarchy is a political system in which power resides in a single family that rules from one generation to the next generation. The power the family enjoys is traditional authority, and many

monarchs command respect because their subjects bestow this type of authority on them. Other monarchs, however, have ensured respect through arbitrary power and even terror. Royal families still rule today, but their power has declined from centuries ago. Today the Queen of England holds a largely ceremonial position, but her predecessors on the throne wielded much more power.

Queen Elizabeth II

Queen Elizabeth II of England holds a largely ceremonial position, but earlier English monarchs held much more power.

This example reflects a historical change in types of monarchies from absolute monarchies to constitutional monarchies. In absolute monarchies, the royal family claims a divine right to rule and exercises considerable power over their kingdom. Absolute monarchies were common in both ancient (e.g., Egypt) and medieval (e.g., England and China) times. In reality, the power of many absolute monarchs was not totally absolute, as kings and queens had to keep in mind the needs and desires of other powerful parties, including the clergy and nobility. Over time, absolute monarchies gave way to constitutional monarchies. In these monarchies, the royal family serves a symbolic and ceremonial role and enjoys little, if any, real power. Instead the executive and legislative branches of government – the prime minister and parliament in several nations – run the government, even if the royal family continues to command admiration and respect. Constitutional monarchies exist today in several nations, including Denmark, Great Britain, Norway, Spain, and Sweden.

Oligarchy

The power in an oligarchy is held by a small, elite group. Unlike in a monarchy, members of an oligarchy do not necessarily achieve their statuses based on ties to noble ancestry. Rather, they may ascend to positions of power because of military might, economic power, or similar circumstances.

The concept of oligarchy is somewhat elusive; rarely does a society openly define itself as an oligarchy. Generally, the word carries negative connotations and conjures notions of a corrupt group whose members make unfair policy decisions in order to maintain their privileged positions. Many modern nations that claim to be democracies are really oligarchies. In fact, some prominent journalists, such as Paul Krugman, who won a Nobel laureate prize in economics, have labeled the United States an oligarchy, pointing to the influence of large corporations and Wall Street executives on U.S. policy. Other political analysts assert that all democracies are really just “elected oligarchies,” or systems in which citizens must vote for an individual who is part of a pool of candidates who come from the society’s elite ruling class.

Oligarchies have existed throughout history, and today many consider Russia an example of oligarchic political structure. After the fall of communism, groups of business owners captured control of this nation’s natural resources and have used the opportunity to expand their wealth and political influence. Once an oligarchic power structure has been established, it can be very difficult for middle- and lower-class citizens to advance their socioeconomic status.

Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism

Authoritarianism and totalitarianism are general terms for nondemocratic political systems ruled by an individual or a group of individuals who are not freely elected by their populations and who often exercise arbitrary power. To be more specific, authoritarianism refers to political systems in which an individual or a group of individuals holds power, restricts or prohibits popular participation in governance, and represses dissent. Totalitarianism refers to political

systems that include all the features of authoritarianism but are even more repressive as they try to regulate and control all aspects of citizens' lives and fortunes. People can be imprisoned for deviating from acceptable practices or may even be killed if they dissent in the mildest of ways.

Compared to democracies and monarchies, authoritarian and totalitarian governments are more unstable politically. The major reason for this is that these governments enjoy no legitimate authority. Instead their power rests on fear and repression. The populations of these governments do not willingly lend their obedience to their leaders and realize that their leaders are treating them very poorly; for both these reasons, they are more likely than populations in democratic states to want to rebel. Sometimes they do rebel, and if the rebellion becomes sufficiently massive and widespread, a revolution occurs. In contrast, populations in democratic states usually perceive that they are treated more or less fairly and, further, that they can change things they do not like through the electoral process. Seeing no need for revolution, they do not revolt.

Since World War II, which helped make the United States an international power, the United States has opposed some authoritarian and totalitarian regimes while supporting others. The Cold War pitted the United States and its allies against Communist nations, primarily the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, and North Korea. But at the same time the United States opposed these authoritarian governments, it supported many others, including those in Chile, Guatemala, and South Vietnam, that repressed and even murdered their own citizens who dared to engage in the kind of dissent constitutionally protected in the United States. Earlier in U.S. history, the federal and state governments repressed dissent by passing legislation that prohibited criticism of World War I and then by imprisoning citizens who criticized that war. During the 1960s and 1970s, the FBI, the CIA, and other federal agencies spied on tens of thousands of citizens who engaged in dissent protected by the First Amendment. While the United States remains a beacon of freedom and hope to much of the world's peoples, its own support for repression in the recent and more distant past suggests that eternal vigilance is needed to ensure that "liberty and justice for all" is not just an empty slogan.

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.2.8. Домашняя работа № 4

Примерный перечень тем

1. Деловая переписка

Примерные задания

Переведите предложения на русский язык:

1. We are enclosing the price list for both items. Will you please give us your prompt answer which item you prefer.
2. The goods shipped by you in execution of our contract No 1500 do not correspond with the sample on the basis of which the order was placed.
3. We have just received a telex from our customer informing us that he does not need the switches. We are confident that we will be able to compensate you for the loss of this order, as our customer has promised to place a bigger order for other electric devices which you manufacture.
4. The delivery of the goods was to have taken place last month, and we have been caused serious inconvenience through the delay.

5. We are taking the opportunity to remind you that lately we have had numerous complaints from our clients who find fault with the packing of your goods.

6. We apologize for the delay and trust that you have not been caused any serious inconvenience.

7. We opened at random a number of cases which showed no sign of damage on the outside, and found that the contents were badly damaged.

8. The goods have only just been received, after a delay of 7 days, for which no explanation has been given.

9. Your order was unfortunately overlooked in the pressure of business, but, we assure you that every effort will be made in future to guarantee delivery in accordance with your requirement.

10. We are looking forward to hearing from you soon and hope that our further relations will be of mutual benefit.

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.3. Описание контрольно-оценочных мероприятий промежуточного контроля по дисциплине модуля

5.3.1. Зачет

Список примерных вопросов

1. 1. Прочитайте предложенный текст. 2. Выпишите незнакомые слова. 3. Переведите текст на русский язык. Could the war in Ukraine go nuclear? Sixty years after the Cuban missile crisis, the world again worries about nuclear war Sixty years ago the world was staring at a nuclear cataclysm. The Cuban missile crisis began in October 1962 when America detected Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. It blockaded the island, and debated invading it. The Soviets yielded, removing their nukes; America secretly removed nuclear-tipped missiles of its own from Turkey. Annihilation was averted. Memories of those terrifying times are being revived by the war in Ukraine. Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, has repeatedly warned that he could resort to nuclear weapons. On September 21st he said he would use "all weapons systems available" to defend the "territorial integrity" of Russia—by implication including all the Ukrainian land he is annexing through sham referendums. "It's not a bluff," said Mr Putin. In response Jake Sullivan, America's national security adviser, sternly warned Russia of "catastrophic consequences" if it used nuclear weapons. The world thus faces what may be the worst period of nuclear peril since Cuba, says Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association, an American lobby group. Russian commentators have drawn explicit parallels between the crises. Both were caused by insecurity provoked by a rival's expansion "right to the doorstep of one's own country: Cuba then, Ukraine now", writes Dmitri Trenin, a Russian analyst, on the state-owned rt website. This time, though, things are different in several important ways. The Cuban crisis lasted 13 days. The war in Ukraine is more than 200 days old, and could last for hundreds more. In Cuba the nukes themselves were the crux of the matter. In Ukraine they are a shield to protect a Russian land-grab. And the nature of the threat has changed with Russia's fortunes on the battlefield. At first, Western officials worried about nuclear escalation resulting from Russian success. If it took Ukraine, might it push further into the Baltic states, or strike at nato depots that were supplying weapons to Ukrainian forces? That could have led to a conventional war, which might have escalated into a nuclear one. Now the worry is about Russian failures. Ukrainian troops have

retaken thousands of square miles of territory; a mobilisation at home has pushed hundreds of thousands of Russians to protest or flee. In the 1960s neither John F. Kennedy nor Nikita Khrushchev, the American and Soviet leaders, wanted a nuclear war. Now, some worry that a flailing Mr Putin might be tempted to gamble that nuclear weapons could help reverse his misfortune. The Cuban missile crisis was largely about “strategic” nuclear weapons—the biggest sort, designed to wipe out enemy cities far from the battlefield. The question in Ukraine revolves mainly around the non-strategic, or “tactical” kind. These are of shorter range and lower explosive power. (Many are nevertheless more powerful than the atomic bombs used against Japan in the second world war). America and the Soviet Union once maintained huge arsenals of tactical warheads for use against each others’ armies on the plains of Europe. In the decades after the cold war, nato gave up all but around 200 of its stockpile, concluding that precision-guided conventional weapons could do the job more cheaply and with fewer complications. Russia’s armed forces held on to 2,000 or so. Nuclear weapons can make up for weaker conventional forces. “The power balance matters less than the willingness to use nukes,” says Francis Gavin, a historian at Johns Hopkins University. “That creates an incentive to be irresponsible.” Experts see three main ways in which Russia might use a nuclear weapon: a “demonstration shot” that does not kill anyone; a strike on Ukraine; and an attack on nato. Russia might start on the “escalation ladder” by conducting nuclear tests, either underground or, more dramatically, in the atmosphere. This could be over the Black Sea or high above Ukraine itself, avoiding deaths but causing an electromagnetic pulse that would fry electrical equipment. But if Ukraine kept on fighting despite the demonstration, Russia would incur global opprobrium for no military gain. Russian generals might prefer to nuke military objectives directly, not least because the Russian army is short of manpower and materiel. Targets could include Ukrainian airfields, logistics hubs and concentrations of artillery, says Ben Barry of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British think-tank. Yet Ukraine’s forces are mostly dispersed, and armies can be surprisingly resilient. One study examining a hypothetical war between India and Pakistan estimated that a five-kiloton bomb (about a third the size of the one dropped on Hiroshima) would knock out just 13 tanks if they were widely spread. Mr Barry reckons four tactical weapons would be needed to neutralise a Ukrainian brigade (roughly 3,000-5,000 soldiers) even if it was concentrated for an offensive. More destructively still, Russia might choose to attack a Ukrainian city to force a surrender. But this raises the possibility of a direct nato intervention and the destruction of Russia’s armies. A nuclear attack on nato would be a potentially suicidal proposition, given that three of its members—America, Britain and France—have nuclear weapons of their own. Tactics and strategy Every option, in other words, comes with big downsides. “It is very hard to make nuclear threats work,” notes Eric Edelman, a former under-secretary for policy at the Pentagon. At times during the cold war—in the Korean war, for instance—America toyed with using nuclear weapons but decided against it as morally repugnant, militarily useless or dangerous. But responding to nuclear threats is hard, too. Deterrence rests on a great deal of ambiguity. American officials will not say publicly what they mean by “catastrophic consequences”, though it hints at the risk of a direct clash between Russia and America. But they claim to have been explicit in private warnings to the Kremlin, and have told journalists that the response is likely to be conventional, not nuclear. In doing so, complains Mr Edelman, “they are undermining the deterrent threat.” America’s warnings are aimed at Russia, America’s allies and the American public. It must be seen to take the threat seriously but not be intimidated; it must respond in a way that is vague yet credible. Whatever happens with Russia will affect its contest with China, not least over Taiwan. Thus far, President Joe Biden has tried to balance two principles: help

Ukraine defend itself, but avoid a third world war. If the Russians detonate nuclear weapons, he has said that the response will depend “on the extent of what they do”. One option would be to pile more economic pressure on Russia, perhaps through secondary sanctions on those buying its oil and gas, with the hope of turning Mr Putin into even more of an international pariah. America could push India and China to isolate Russia. Both have obliquely signalled disapproval of its conduct in the war. But India relies on Russia for weapons, and China sees it as a useful counter-balance to America. Another option would be for the West to help Ukraine fight in a nuclear battlefield, by providing advice, protective gear and decontamination equipment. It could also supply more advanced arms—such as Western-made tanks, fighter jets and longer-ranged missiles—that have thus far been deemed too escalatory. At the other end of the scale, America, Britain or France could respond with a limited nuclear strike of their own. But that risks a wider nuclear war—and Russia has more tactical nukes than its Western rivals. The middle way—a conventional military response—is the likeliest. This might include deploying nato troops to Ukraine, or carrying out direct strikes on Russian targets. America could, for instance, destroy the ports, air bases, or mobile missile launchers used in any Russian nuclear attack. Ben Hodges, a retired general who once commanded American ground forces in Europe, suggests sinking Russia’s Black Sea fleet, or destroying its bases in Crimea. Mr Putin, though, could raise the ante. He might launch a counter-strike against comparable targets—American warships in the Mediterranean, say, or military facilities on nato soil. In other words, even a conventional response could easily bring about a direct nato-Russia conflict, with its attendant risk of nuclear war. All of which raises the question: would America really run such risks for the sake of Ukraine, which is not a formal military ally? Barack Obama, who as president refused to arm Ukraine, argued that Russia, in the end, cared more about Ukraine than America did, saying “we have to be very clear about what our core interests are and what we are willing to go to war for.” Those who favour standing by Ukraine offer two responses. The first is that the risks are less acute than they seem. Russia is in no position to fight a conventional war against America and its 29 nato allies; a nuclear war would risk the total destruction of both sides. The second riposte is that the risks are worth it. Allowing Russia to use nuclear blackmail to seize territory would encourage autocrats everywhere to do the same. “That would be a terrible world to live in. The cost of stopping it later is higher than stopping it at the outset,” argues Mr Edelman. For now, to everyone’s great relief, deterrence is holding. Mr Putin has not used nuclear weapons, nor is nato fighting in Ukraine. America says it has seen no evidence of Russia readying its nuclear armaments for use. America and Russia are continuing to exchange information about their respective strategic arsenals. For Max Hastings, author of “Abyss”, a new history of the Cuban crisis, the main lesson of 1962 also applies to 2022: “Be afraid.” What averted a cataclysm was Kennedy’s and Khrushchev’s fear of nuclear war. America’s success was the product of Kennedy’s sober mixture of resolve and a willingness to compromise in private. That suggests the West should continue to help Ukraine defend itself while “recognising that somewhere along the line it will probably end up with a dirty deal” to end the war, argues Mr Hastings. The trouble is that, at the moment, Mr Putin is raising the stakes, not seeking a deal. His annexation of Ukrainian territory and mobilisation of extra troops risks elevating a “special military operation”, which can be ended whenever he chooses, into a war for Russian soil, which he must win or lose. Unlike the collective Soviet leadership of 1962, which imposed some moderation, Mr Putin’s underlings seem powerless to restrain him. He has long equated his own rule with Russia’s existence. In 2018, he spoke in near-mystical terms about using nuclear weapons to defend Russia: “We, the victims of aggression, as martyrs, will go to heaven, while they will just die,

because they will not even have time to repent.” Thus the world watches another nuclear crisis unfold: will Mr Putin cut his losses, fight on, or take the biggest risk of all?

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5.3.2. Экзамен

Список примерных вопросов

1. 1. Прочитайте предложенный текст. 2. Выпишите незнакомые слова. 3. Переведите текст на английский язык. A new macroeconomic era is emerging. What will it look like? A great rebalancing between governments and central banks is under way For months there has been turmoil in financial markets and growing evidence of stress in the world economy. You might think that these are just the normal signs of a bear market and a coming recession. But, as our special report this week lays out, they also mark the painful emergence of a new regime in the world economy—a shift that may be as consequential as the rise of Keynesianism after the second world war, and the pivot to free markets and globalisation in the 1990s. This new era holds the promise that the rich world might escape the low-growth trap of the 2010s and tackle big problems such as ageing and climate change. But it also brings acute dangers, from financial chaos to broken central banks and out-of-control public spending. The ructions in the markets are of a magnitude not seen for a generation. Global inflation is in double digits for the first time in nearly 40 years. Having been slow to respond, the Federal Reserve is now cranking up interest rates at the fastest pace since the 1980s, while the dollar is at its strongest for two decades, causing chaos outside America. If you have an investment portfolio or a pension, this year has been gruesome. Global shares have dropped by 25% in dollar terms, the worst year since at least the 1980s, and government bonds are on course for their worst year since 1949. Alongside some \$40trn of losses there is a queasy sense that the world order is being upended as globalisation heads into retreat and the energy system is fractured after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. All this marks a definitive end to the age of economic placidity in the 2010s. After the global financial crisis of 2007-09 the performance of rich economies assumed a feeble pattern. Investment by private firms was subdued, even at those making monster profits, while governments did not take up the slack: the public capital stock actually shrank around the world, as a share of gdp, in the decade after Lehman Brothers collapsed. Economic growth was sluggish and inflation was low. With the private and public sectors doing little to stimulate more activity, central banks became the only game in town. They held interest rates at rock-bottom levels and bought huge volumes of bonds at any sign of trouble, extending their reach ever further into the economy. On the eve of the pandemic central banks in America, Europe and Japan owned a staggering \$15trn of financial assets. The extraordinary challenge of the pandemic led to extraordinary actions which helped unleash today’s inflation: wild government stimulus and bail-outs, temporarily skewed patterns of consumer demand and lockdown-induced supply-chain tangles. That inflationary impulse has since been turbocharged by the energy crunch as Russia, one of the largest exporters of fossil fuels along with Saudi Arabia, has isolated itself from its markets in the West. Faced with a serious inflation problem the Fed has already raised rates from a maximum of 0.25% to 3.25% and is expected to take them to 4.5% by early 2023. Globally, most monetary authorities are tightening too. What on earth comes next? One immediate fear is of a blow-up, as a financial system that has become habituated to low rates wakes up to the soaring cost of borrowing. Although one mid-sized lender, Credit Suisse, is under pressure, it is unlikely that banks will become a big problem: most have bigger safety buffers than in the past. Instead the dangers lie elsewhere, in a new-look financial system that relies less on banks and more on fluid markets

and technology. The good news is that your deposits are not about to go up in smoke. The bad news is that this system for financing firms and consumers is opaque and hypersensitive to losses. You can already see this in the credit markets. As firms that buy debt shy away from risk, the interest rate on mortgages and junk bonds is soaring. The market for “leveraged loans” used to finance corporate buy-outs has seized up—if Elon Musk buys Twitter the resulting debts may become a big problem. Meanwhile investment funds, including pension schemes, face losses on the portfolios of illiquid assets they have accumulated. Parts of the plumbing could stop working. The Treasury market has become more erratic (see Buttonwood) while European energy firms have faced crushing collateral calls on their hedges. Britain’s bond market has been thrown into chaos by obscure derivatives bets made by its pension funds. If markets stop working smoothly, impeding the flow of credit or threatening contagion, central banks may step in: already the Bank of England has done a u-turn and started buying bonds again, cutting against its simultaneous commitment to raise rates. The related belief that central banks will not have the resolve to follow through on their tough talk is behind the other big fear: that the world will return to the 1970s, with rampant inflation. In one sense this is alarmist and over the top. Most forecasters reckon inflation in America will fall from the present 8% to 4% in 2023 as energy price-rises ebb and higher rates bite. Yet while the odds of inflation going to 20% are tiny, there is a glaring question about whether governments and central banks will ever bring it back down to 2%. A moving target To understand why, look beyond the hurly-burly to the long-term fundamentals. In a big shift from the 2010s, a structural rise in government spending and investment is under way. Ageing citizens will need more health care. Europe and Japan will spend more on defence to counter threats from Russia and China. Climate change and the quest for security will boost state investment in energy, from renewable infrastructure to gas terminals. And geopolitical tensions are leading governments to spend more on industrial policy. Yet even as investment rises, demography will weigh ever more heavily on rich economies. As people get older they save more, and this excess of savings will continue to act to depress the underlying real rate of interest. As a result the fundamental trends in the 2020s and 2030s are for bigger government but still-low real interest rates. For central banks this creates an acute dilemma. In order to get inflation down to their targets of roughly 2% they may have to tighten enough to cause a recession. This would incur a high human cost in the form of job losses and trigger a fierce political backlash. Moreover, if the economy deflates and ends up back in the low-growth, low-rate trap of the 2010s, central banks may once again lack enough stimulus tools. The temptation now is to find another way out: to ditch the 2% inflation targets of recent decades and raise them modestly to, say, 4%. That is likely to be on the menu when the Fed begins its next strategy review in 2024. This brave new world of somewhat higher government spending and somewhat higher inflation would have advantages. In the short run it would mean a less severe recession or none at all. And in the long run it would mean that central banks have more room to cut interest rates in a downturn, reducing the need for bond-buying and bail-outs whenever anything goes wrong, which cause ever-greater distortion of the economy. Yet it also comes with big dangers. Central banks’ credibility will be damaged: if the goalposts are moved once, why not again? Millions of contracts and investments written on the promise of 2% inflation would be disrupted, while mildly higher inflation would redistribute wealth from creditors to debtors. Meanwhile, the promise of moderately bigger government could easily spiral out of control, if populist politicians make reckless spending pledges or if state investments in energy and industrial policy are poorly executed and morph into bloated vanity projects that drag down productivity. These opportunities and dangers are daunting. But it is time to start weighing them and their

implications for citizens and businesses. The biggest mistakes in economics are failures of imagination that reflect an assumption that today's regime will last for ever. It never does. Change is coming. Get ready.

LMS-платформа – не предусмотрена

5.4 Содержание контрольно-оценочных мероприятий по направлениям воспитательной деятельности

Направления воспитательной деятельности сопрягаются со всеми результатами обучения компетенций по образовательной программе, их освоение обеспечивается содержанием всех дисциплин модулей.